Abstract -Data integrity is one of the major concerns with cloud data storage for cloud user. Besides, the cloud user's constrained computing capabilities make the task of data integrity auditing expensive and even formidable. In recent years, many public data integrity verification schemes have been proposed, however, most of them are vulnerable to an efficient active attack, which means that the active adversary is able to arbitrarily modify the cloud data without being detected by the auditor. In this work, by utilizing blinding factor, we proposed a new proof of retrievability scheme, which can resist active attack and keep the privacy of the data in the auditing process. Extensive security analysis shows our proposed scheme is provably secure.
Introduction
By using cloud storage, people can remotely store their data and access them via networks at anytime and from anywhere. Despite the obvious benefits, it also brings new security challenges to the cloud data security. Data integrity and Confidentiality are two biggest concerns. So following the first scheme constructed in [1] , a number of new data integrity verification schemes and improvements have been proposed, such as [2] , [3] , [4] . Most of them consist of five algorithms (KeyGen, SigGen, Challenge, GenProof, VerifyProof). KeyGen is a key generation algorithm that is run by the data owner. SigGen is used by the data owner to generate authentication tag for each data block i m . Challenge is run by the TPA to produce the challenging message. GenProof is run by the cloud server to generate a proof of data integrity, while VerifyProof is run by the TPA to audit the proof. For the proof information generated in the GenProof algorithm is not provided authentication and it is in linear with i m , most of the existing scheme are vulnerable to an efficient active attack. That is to say, an active adversary may corrupt or alter the data at his will after data owner stores its data file and the authentication tags in the cloud. Then only with the information how data are modified, the active adversary can change the wrong proof information to a valid one which can pass the VerifyProof algorithm.
In this paper, we propose a public proof of Retrievability scheme against active attack. Our work utilizes the technique of public key based homomorphic linear authenticator (or HLA for short) and constant size polynomial commitment technique. What's more, we introduce blinding factor into the GenProof algorithm, so that the active adversary cannot compute the valid proof information, that is to say, if the data file stored in the cloud is modified by an active adversary, there is on way to produce a valid proof information which can pass the VerifyProof algorithm except for the situation that the cloud server colludes with the active adversary, however, this is no good for the cloud sever, so we can assume this situation does not exist.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide the detailed description of our scheme in Section 2. Section 3 gives the Security analysis. Finally, We conclude our whole paper in section 4.
The Proposed Scheme
This section presents our PoR scheme which can resist active attack and keep the privacy of the data files in the auditing process. After introducing notations, we describe the construction and show the correctness of our scheme. 
SigGen: To outsource a file F , the data owner first obtain ' F by applying erasure code. Then the owner randomly chooses a file name 
server divides the polynomial ( ) ( ) f x f r  with () xr  using polynomial long division, and denotes the coefficients vector of the resulting quotient polynomial as 
If Eq.1 holds, the user outputs AuditRst as accept; otherwise, outputs AuditRst as reject.
Correctness: we analyse the correctness of our construction based on Eq.1 as: 
Security Analysis
In this section, we start from giving the assumptions used in our scheme, then we evaluate the security of our scheme by analysing its fulfillment of the security guarantee, namely, the soundness, confidentiality and Active Attack Resistance property. 
Definition 1. Discrete Logarithm Problem
And we can get Theorem 2. If the signature scheme used for authentication tags is existentially unforgeable, the CDH problem, the Static Diffie-Hellman problem and the t-SDH problem are hard in bilinear groups, then, in the random oracle model, no adversary against the soundness of our public PoR scheme could cause verifier to accept in a proof-ofretrievability protocol instance with non-negligible probability, except by responding with correctly computed values Prf .
Proof: It is easy to prove that the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable based on the CDH problem. In concrete, if there is an adversary that can break our signature scheme, we show how to use this adversary to solve the CDH problem as follows: set . Hence, the signature scheme used for authentication tags is existentially unforgeable.
Next, we prove that any proof information which can pass the verifyproof algorithm of our scheme must be the correct proof information.
Suppose a probabilistic polynomial time adversary Adv can generate a ( , , ),( , , ) ( , , ) Prf y y y
and pass the verification in our proposed scheme, we can get the following two equations: have to be computed based on actual data blocks according to our scheme.
Based on our above analysis, we prove that there is no
